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Margin Requirement Impacts on Live Cattle Futures Hedges
Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 7/10/09
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  50 lbs, FOB.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,   
  51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
  Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
  FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
98.51
130.65
117.85
173.34
73.31
28.38
80.36
113.00
278.99
81.79
112.32
102.04
139.78
55.76
45.00
56.21
115.00
258.07
81.61
116.75
105.22
137.81
57.76
39.62
56.12
103.00
257.01
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.66
6.34
15.70
10.68
4.03
5.57
3.99
12.42
6.54
2.41
4.52
3.04
10.35
5.02
2.15
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Premium
  Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
190.00
77.50
85.00
183.00
68.00
        *
        *
        *
132.87
49.87
       *
       *
       *
97.50
39.50
*No Market
All buyers and sellers of futures contracts have to
post margin money through their brokers to act as a
performance bond. This margin money financially secures
their position and protects the party on the opposite side
of the transaction from default. Generally, the margin
requirement for a futures contract is established at a level
close to the maximum amount that any short or long
trader could lose in any one-day trading period because
each day the account is “marked-to-the-market” and the
daily gain or loss is reflected in the account balance at the
end of the day. The maximum amount of loss is
determined by the daily price limit. For example, the daily
price limit on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)
Group Live Cattle futures contract is $3.00/cwt. So, for
the 400 cwt. contract, the largest increase in contract
value in a one-day period would be $1,200 (which would
be a loss for the short trader), and the largest daily
decrease in contract would be $1,200 (which would be a
loss for the long trader). The margin requirement is also
established according to the volatility of the futures
contract price. The more volatile prices are, the more
likely the daily price limit will be reached, and thus the
margin requirement increases.
The daily price limit on the CME Group Live Cattle
contract increased from $1.50/cwt. to $3.00/cwt. at the
end of 2003 following the first U.S. case of BSE, which
generated limit down futures prices for several days in a
row. Not only has the price limit increased, but the
volatility of futures prices has increased over the years. As
a result, CME Group has increased initial and
maintenance margin requirements for hedgers and
speculators to reflect these market changes. The initial
margin requirement (IMR) is the amount of money that
must be posted in order to initiate a futures trade. The
maintenance margin requirement (MMR) is the minimum
amount of money the margin account can have on a daily
basis to maintain the position. Typically, hedgers (often
called commercials), have lower margin requirements
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than speculators (or non-commercials) because they
own the underlying physical commodity.  Figure 1
shows that the initial margin requirement (IMR) for
hedgers and speculators has increased from $475 and
$642, respectively, on January 1, 2000 to $1,200 and
$1,620 on October 8, 2008. Granted, at times over these
nine years the IMR and MMR have declined, but
generally they have increased substantially in recent
years.
The increase in the margin requirements can be
concerning to commercial hedgers if it limits their
access to the futures market, thus restricting their risk
management alternatives. Cattle feeders are one such
type of commercial hedger. Cattle feeders looking to
hedge a future sale of fed cattle would take a short
position in the CME Group Live Cattle futures contract
and post the IMR (currently $1,200 per contract). Given
that the 400 cwt. contract would be worth a total of
about $32,000 (at a price of $80/cwt.), the $1,200
margin requirement is relatively small and makes this a
highly leveraged position (IMR is about 4 percent of
value). However, it is less leveraged now than in 2000
when, for example, prices were closer to $70/cwt.
(contract value of $28,000) and the margin requirement
was $475 (IMR was less than 2 percent of value).
Losing this amount of leverage on an instrument that
hedges about 35 head of fed steers is concerning for
hedgers as credit availability shrinks due to equity losses
in the cattle feeding sector and may be limiting hedging
among some producers.
Using Commitment of Traders data reported by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, we examined
the correlation between the margin requirements for
commercials and non-commercials with the net
positions held by commercials and “non-reportable
positions traders” (smaller traders, either hedgers or
speculators, that buy or sell fewer than 200 contracts).
A strong negative correlation would suggest that
increases in the IMR or MMR lead to decreases in the
number of net long positions taken by commercials or
small traders, or more short positions (i.e., that they
were hedging more cattle). Results of that analysis
reveal very little correlation. The correlation between
the IMR and the positions held by commercial traders
(hedgers) is 0.04273 (P>0.39). Thus, there appears to be
little relationship between higher IMR and the number
of short positions held by commercial hedgers. A
similar small and statistically insignificant result was
observed between the IMR for hedgers and the positions
held by small traders. However, the IMR for speculators
appears to be more correlated with positions held by
non-commercial speculators, with a correlation
coefficient of -0.10 (P<0.05). This indicates that
speculators tended to be short one-tenth of one
additional futures contract for each one dollar increase
in the IMR.  This potentially could make hedging for1
short traders more difficult because fewer long traders
would have been in the market during this time period.
Because the MMR closely follows the IMR, similar
results are obtained for the correlation between the MMR
and positions held by commercials, non-commercials and
small traders.
It also appeared that increases in the margin
requirements had very little impact on volume or open
interest in the CME Group Live Cattle futures contract.
Volume is the total number of futures contracts traded in
a day and is an indicator of the level of intensity in the
market. Open interest is the total number of contracts
outstanding at a particular point in time and measures
traders commitment to be in the market. If increases in the
IMR and MMR were having a negative impact on futures
transactions, it might be manifested in decreases in
volume and open interest. Our analysis found little
correlation between changes in margin requirements and
immediate changes in volume and open interest. The
correlation between the IMR (for both hedgers and
speculators) and volume is very small and statistically not
different than zero (P>0.87). Similarly, the correlation
with open interest is small and statistically insignificant as
well (P>0.62). So it doesn’t appear that increases in the
IMR have reduced volume and open interest in the CME
Group Live Cattle futures contract.
In conclusion, these results suggest that there is little
correlation between the positions held by commercial
hedgers, non-commercial speculators and small traders
and the IMR and MMR to trade the CME Group Live
Cattle futures contract. Increasing the margin require-
ment might be concerning to some commercial hedgers if
it limits their ability to fund margin accounts and maintain
hedge trades in the market. While that could happen for
individual traders, it doesn’t appear to be the case for the
entire market.
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This relationship, while statistically significant, does not imply causation,1 
only that there was, in this case, a negative relationship between the
variables during the time period of the study.
     Table 1.  Correlation Coefficients Between Margin Requirements and Positions Held by Traders, Volume, and   
                      Open Interest
Positions Held By
Commercial
Hedgers
Positions Held By
Non-commercial
Speculators
Positions Held By
Non-Reportable
(Small) Traders Volume Open Interest
IMR  Hedgers  a 0.04273 -0.10535 0.07023 -0.0008 -0.02436
(0.3935) (0.035) (0.1604) (0.9873) (0.6267)c
IMR Speculators  0.05292 -0.10298 0.05574 0.00798 -0.01576
(0.2905) (0.0393) (0.2654) (0.8734) (0.753)
MMR  Hedgers  b 0.04273 -0.10535 0.07023 -0.0008 -0.02436
(0.3935) (0.035) (0.1604) (0.9873) (0.6267) 
MMR Speculators  0.04273 -0.10535 0.07023 -0.0008 -0.02436
(0.3935) (0.035) (0.1604) (0.9873) (0.6267)
 IMR = Initial Margin Requirementa
 MMR = Maintenance Margin Requirementb
 Number in parentheses is P-value (if P<0.05, then the correlation is statistically different from zero)c
Figure 1.
